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ABSTRACT: Citing an epistemic or cognitive asymmetry between experts and the public, it is easy to view the 
relation between scientists and citizens as primarily based on trust, rather than on the content of expert 
argumentation. In criticism of this claim, four theses are defended: (1) Empirical studies suggest that content 
matters, while trust(worthiness) boasts persuasiveness. (2) In social policy controversies, genuine expert-solutions 
are normally not available; if trust is important here, then a clear role for cognitive asymmetry is wanting. (3) 
Social policy controversies pivot on values, so that biases and ideologies may explain participant behavior. (4) 
Few experts communicate perfectly; rather than cognitive ones, one might cite social differences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is standard to claim that laypersons, policy makers included, are often deficient in the sense 
of being unable to fully understand expert argumentation, and must therefore—on the grounds 
of an epistemic or cognitive asymmetry—base policy decision exclusively or to a large extent 
on trust. This claim features at least implicitly in explanations why some audiences receive an 
expert’s reason-claim complex as a mere appeal to authority (catchphrase: only the conclusion 
travels, but the reasons receive no uptake).  
 Furthermore, the cognitive asymmetry claim serves to explain the observation that 
expert argumentation may change upon “traveling” across contexts (Rehg, 2010), for instance 
“from a technical argument to an appeal to authority” (Goodwin & Honeycutt, 2010, p. 22). 
The above claim may also feature in explanations why the public context regularly witnesses 
attempts at lowering the expert’s trustworthiness (ad hominem argumentation) rather than 
counter-argumentation engaging critically with the cognitive content of the expert’s reasons.  
 As it were, participants to public context discussions are unable to engage at the level 
required for an expert context. Yet, these participants regularly align their discourse to, and 
therefore presumably understand, the role of (implicit) trust.1 As Weingart (1999) contends, 
when it comes to policy making, some evaluative verdicts are inevitable: 
                                                
1  For Hardwig (1991) “[i]f A trusts B implicitly, she will often not have or even feel the need to have good 
reasons to believe what B says” (p. 699, italics mine). The importance of trust is recognized in science 
communication and elsewhere. “Key to the relationship between science and the public is trust” (Gregory & 
Miller, 1998), cited after Borchelt (2008, p. 153) who treats trust as an amalgam comprising competence, 
integrity, and dependability of scientists. 
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If scientific knowledge is linked in any way to ‘interests’ (in policy-making), it is evaluated as 
supportive, contradictory, or even dangerous. Knowledge inevitably comes under these evaluative 
verdicts once it enters the public arena and is considered politically relevant. This is, again, an 
aspect of the politicisation of science inseparable from the scientification of politics. (Weingart, 
1999, p. 56) 
Our purpose is to critically examine the explanatory value of the cognitive asymmetry claim. 
In particular, we question its usefulness in explaining (what appears to us as) a regular pattern 
in expert-layperson communication: cognitive message-contents originating with an expert 
meet with a primarily non-cognitive (or affective) response by non-expert audiences. Our 
thesis is that an appeal to epistemic or cognitive audience-deficits explains too much, and 
potentially hides alternative explanations from analysts’ views. 
 Section 2 provides a sketch of the explanation which grounds the public uptake of 
expert argumentation as a mere authority argument, such that audiences are more aligned to 
considerations of ethos rather than logos (see below). To express this in a more precise 
manner, Bayesian terms prove helpful and—paired with empirical results—lead to a rival 
explanation that is open to empirical testing (Sect. 3). We then present four challenges with 
respect to the cognitive asymmetry claim (Sect. 4), and close with a brief summary (Sect. 5). 
2. EXPLANATION SKETCH ON A DEFICIT MODEL 
The explanation sketch is as follows: Complete understanding of an expert’s reason-claim-
complex is not possible, unless message recipients possess domain-specific information and/or 
skills comparable to that of the expert-sender. Non-experts are assumed to lack as much. In this 
respect, they may be considered deficient—hence the term deficit model.2 As it were, lay folk 
cannot evaluate the expert’s reason-claim-complex on a cognitive basis. Here, cognition 
contrasts and indeed competes with emotions or affects, widely understood, and crucially with 
(dis)trust. 
 To illustrate, assume that an expert, EXP, forwards reasons R1, …, Rn to support a 
policy P, and to undermine a range of alternative policies, P* (which to support would entail 
that P is a suboptimal choice vis-à-vis P*). Assume further that a non-expert hearer, H, 
understands at least P (and possibly also P*), while the same does not hold for each Rn 
presented by EXP, or for the manner in which EXP construes the support between R1, …, Rn 
and P (and, respectively, construes undermining P*). Finally, assume that H desires to 
                                                
2  The deficit model has been criticized and is sometimes rejected as inadequate for science communication. 
Alternatives include the dialogue and the participation model, both of which recognize citizens’ active role as 
discourse partners and providers of local knowledge, respectively. See Bucchi (2008) for an overview. As 
Jones and Salter’s (2003) discourse analytical study demonstrates, the deficit model nevertheless “retains a 
foothold in the discourse arena” (p. 30). More than that:  
It can be argued that the transparency and openness frame [which, for instance, includes scientist-
citizen consensus meetings] is in fact a revised version of the deficit model. … [T]he assumption 
that a deficit of information suggests a deficit in ability has been discarded, but the assumption that, 
if the public had the appropriate information, they would support the new technology has been 
retained. This is where transparency reinvents the deficit model. (Jones & Slater, 2003, p. 34) 
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personally evaluate P vis-à-vis EXP’s reason-claim-complex, rather than withhold judgment 
(epoché).3  
 On the deficit model, it now sounds natural that H will seek recourse to other cues as 
the basis for an evaluation of EXP’s argument.4 Social psychological experiments can 
demonstrate that, under controlled conditions, evaluations may exclusively build on 
“atmospheric” factors, i.e., cognition may be replaced by affect (see the empirical study by 
Witte & Boy, 2007, reported in Zenker, forthcoming).5 To say that, in such cases, a hearer’s 
evaluation is comparatively more attuned to the speaker’s ethos than logos (and using these 
terms in a wide sense) renders the phenomenon in traditional terms. 
 By finding it remarkable that evaluations of argumentative messages may be attuned 
also to a speaker’s ethos, one implicitly suggests that—as far as the evaluation of expert 
argumentation is concerned—considerations of ethos and logos need not always cohere. 
Particularly, two cases are of interest: ethos overrides/replaces logos; ethos influences logos. In 
both cases, H’s evaluation of the expert’s argument (or justification) for a policy P may be 
negatively affected vis-à-vis one not coming about under conditions of a cognitive deficit. 
 The above sketch can be used to suggest a reason why ad hominem argumentation is 
with some frequency reconstructable in public discussions of social policies: personal 
characteristics of the message source, i.e., the expert, become more important than the 
cognitive contents of the message. Irrespective of whether our currently best measures of the 
public understanding of science in fact support the deficit model (see Sturgis & Allum, 2004 
for a criticism), our ability to account for the occurrence of ad hominem argumentation lets the 
deficit model appear attractive. It suggests why empirically validated verbal participant 
behavior comes about.6 
3. BAYESIAN EXPRESSIONS 
To make the above more precise, one may use standard terms from the Bayesian approach to 
argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006). One would like expressions for the comparative 
contributions of cognitive and affective factors to the evaluative result of a reasoning claim 
complex. Let E (for evidence), particularly Elogos and Eethos abbreviate the cognitive and the 
                                                
3  This last condition may easily go unnoticed. Pace those with high hopes for participatory democracy, it is not 
a given that a lay person desires to form an opinion on a policy option, unless personal reasons motivate. 
Moreover, the issue would be precluded negatively, unless one assumes audiences to be unbiased in the sense 
of not already fully endorsing a policy alternative to that being argued for. I return to this in Sect. 5. 
4  Goldman (2001) explicitly recognizes the reasonability of evaluating experts also on the basis of how they 
handle dialectical obligations in debate settings: 
The idea of indirect argumentative justification arises from the idea that one speaker in a debate 
may demonstrate dialectical superiority over the other, and this dialectical superiority might be a 
plausible indicator for [the non-expert or novice] N of greater expertise, even if it doesn’t render N 
directly justified in believing the superior speaker’s conclusion. (p. 95, italics mine) 
5  Zenker (forthcoming) contends that the cognition/affect distinction, although “rough and ready,” deserves to 
be developed (rather than rejected), and should come out as a limiting case of any distinction replacing it. 
6  Compare how Pragma-dialecticians explain the occurrence of fallacies, namely in a functional way as a 
conflict in balancing a rhetorical and a dialectical goal (van Eemeren, 2010). In contrast, the deficit model 
suggests what in Durkeim’s terms is a real explanation, purporting to name the efficient cause of a social 
phenomenon. 
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affective components of a message. Further, let H (for hypothesis) abbreviate the policy in 
question, and P(H) the subjective degree of belief in this hypothesis (P for probability).  
 Then the ratio P(H|Elogos) over P(H|Eethos) equals 1 if and only if (iff) considerations of 
ethos and logos contribute equally; it is <1 iff ethos considerations outweigh logos 
considerations; and it is >1 in the reverse case. Furthermore, it may seem natural to assume that 
the sum of logos and ethos considerations yields a measure for the overall evaluation of a 
policy (or, in our terms, a hypothesis). This would yield (1): 
(1) P(H|Elogos, Eethos) = P(H|Elogos) + P(H|Eethos) 
However, the overall evaluation may well be a more complex function (abbreviated f) than 
mere summation, yielding (2)—to which we return below: 
(2) P(H|Elogos, Eethos) = f [P(H|Elogos), P(H|Eethos)] 
Another standard assumption is that messages received from experts are more reliable than 
messages received from non-experts. This is normally expressed by demanding that, for 
experts, the probability of (receiving) the evidence(-report) is greater if the hypothesis is true 
than if it is false, as in (3). 
(3) P(E|H)>P(E|not H)  [likelihoods of receiving evidence from reliable sources] 
Adjusting (3) to the distinction between evidence based on the expert’s logos and evidence 
based on considerations of the expert’s ethos yields: 
(4) P(Elogos, Eethos|H) > P(Elogos, Eethos|not H)  
4. SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Empirical studies suggest that, when asked to compare messages, participants tend to rate the 
following, in this order, as increasingly less persuasive evidence types: statistical evidence, 
expert report, causal evidence, anecdotal evidence (aka non-expert report) (Hornikx, 2008). 
Pornpitakpan (2004, p. 243) finds “[t]he main effect studies of source credibility on persuasion 
seem to indicate the superiority of a high-credibility source over a low-credibility one.” 
 Moreover, when comparing participants’ degree of belief in a conclusion vis-à-vis 
evidence received from a comparatively more reliable source (read: expert) and from a 
comparatively less reliable source (read: non-expert), Hahn, Harris, & Corner (2009) and 
Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris (2012) report the earlier to boost the posterior belief. Put more 
succinctly: 
(5) P(H|EEXP) > P(H|EnonEXP) ≥ P(H) [comparison of prior and posterior belief in a 
hypothesis, given evidence from an expert or a non-expert source] 
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Fig. 1. Crossing weak and strong evidence types  
with reliable and unreliable sources (Hahn et al., 2012) 
 Hahn et al. (2012) further report that, when crossing weak and strong evidence types 
with reliable and unreliable sources, P(H|E) turns out to be sensitive to both the persuasive 
strength of the evidence and the reliability of the message source (see Fig. 1). A reliable source 
communicating a strong (or persuasive) type of evidence correlates with a comparatively 
greater increase in the posterior degree of belief than a reliable source communicating a weak 
type of evidence. 
 These and similar studies being externally valid would suggest that some audiences 
can and do distinguish types of evidential strength. Such results create difficulties for the view 
that, provided only the conclusion travels across contexts, then for cognitive reasons (see 
below). Moreover, for the overall evaluation of the message, audiences seem to treat the 
reliability of a message source literally as a contributing factor, and not as a summand. 
 Provided one identifies the intended effect of an ad hominem (which aims at 
discrediting the expert’s ethos) as the lowering of the perceived reliability of the message 
source, it is natural to ask: as low as what? Obviously, it is not clear to what degree of belief 
audiences change if a presumably reliable source is attacked on the basis of ethos 
considerations. One might think that attacking the expert’s ethos lowers an audience’s degree 
of belief at most to that applicable if a non-expert (i.e., a comparatively less reliable source) 
presents an identical argument (or: the same evidence). In this case, the degree of belief would 
be that which is effected when only content merits are tracked, i.e., P(H|Elogos). 
 However, it is at least possible that an ad hominem affects a degree of belief at values 
below that assigned to a comparatively less reliable source communicating the same evidence. 
Thus, just as source reliability boosts the posterior degree of belief (in ways modeled by a 
factor rather than a summand; see Fig. 1), an ad hominem could influence audiences’ degrees 
of belief in a similar factorial way—but in the negative direction.  
 If so, then ad hominem argumentation may be frequently reconstructable not (so 
much) because audiences are unable to engage with the argument content (in a cognitive 
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manner), but because the attack on the source’s ethos may be the more powerful suasory 
strategy7—more powerful, because it leads to a comparatively greater reduction in the 
audience’s degree of belief than engaging cognitively as a non-expert with an expert-claim 
might. It is another matter altogether whether this is how things should be. 
 Vis-à-vis this hypothesis, consider the (ethno-methodologically valid) observation that 
a necessary condition for identifying an expert-context is—not the absence, but—the presumed 
irrelevance of objections geared solely towards the ethos of the arguer (or expert). This stance 
is defended in Zenker (2011). If implicit trust is enjoyed, an ad hominem move would hardly 
arise. Else, expert contexts assume that evaluations are (largely) brought about and (largely) 
remain independent of evaluations of the expert’s ethos. Thus, depending on the context in 
which the argument arises or to which it may travel (here: an expert vs. a non-expert context), 
the function f in P(H|Elogos, Eethos) = f [P(H|Elogos), P(H|Eethos)] may differ markedly. 
5. FOUR PROBLEMS FOR THE DEFICIT MODEL 
The above yields a straightforward empirical question: In a public context, does an ad 
hominem attack lead to comparatively greater reductions of an audience’s degree of belief in 
the expert’s claim than engaging with that claim cognitively as a non-expert? The question is 
presumably not so much in need of discussion, but demands empirical investigation.  
 What may need discussion is the claim that an empirical investigation is at all worth 
pursuing. To support this latter claim, we now present four problems for the deficit model. 
Above, we had taken this model to suggest why the public context is “ripe” with ad hominem 
attacks against expert argumentation, namely: non-expert participants to the public context 
cannot engage cognitively with the expert’s argumentation. We would like to suggest that this 
may be true (or relevant) in far fewer cases than readily assumed.  
 Although participants may be able to engage cognitively, they may chose not to do so 
whenever cognitive reasons do not significantly favor one policy option over others (Sect. 5.1), 
or for strategic reasons, i.e., when arguing ad hominem is the more persuasive strategy (Sect. 
5.2), or for moral reasons, i.e., when policy controversies pivot on moral differences (Sect. 
5.3). Finally, we suggest that some cases allegedly indicative of cognitive differences between 
expert and lay audience might be viewed as cases of communicative incompetence (Sect. 5.4). 
5.1 When Content Matters but Trust Counts 
The literature harbors case studies of so-called controversies, including scientific ones (e.g., on 
the “nature” of light), and those at the boundary between science and society (e.g., nuclear 
energy, stem cell research, global warming). Here, it is characteristic that unique expert 
                                                
7  Martin (2000, p. 203) observes for the case of science debating:  
It is extremely difficult, though not impossible, for audience members to seriously challenge or 
expose a speaker. Experienced speakers have heard nearly every question many times before and 
rehearsed their responses. Furthermore, they have the authority of being the speaker, with a 
presumption of more time to speak and having the last word. Occasionally, though, a speaker may 
lose a joust with an audience member, usually by being caught off guard or ill prepared by someone 
who is extremely knowledgeable and well prepared. 
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solutions are not known at the time one may legitimately speak of a controversy.8 With the 
“[q]uasi-experimental implementation of new technologies” (Weingartner, 1999, p. 158) being 
the current normal case, analysts may therefore expect various mutually exclusive policy 
options to be available also because the technological alternatives may not yet be worked out 
such that exactly one alternative may deemed to be objectively best. 
[A] multitude of scientific–technical issues has captured public attention: the safety of recombinant 
DNA, the ethics of reproductive technologies, the application of biotechnology in agriculture, the 
ethical, political and economic implications of sequencing the human genome, the depletion of the 
ozone layer, the implications of CO2 emissions for anthropogenic climate change, the transferability 
of mad cow disease (BSE) to humans, and other less visible ones. In all these controversies, it has 
become commonplace that the adversarial parties, be they governmental or non-governmental 
groups, engage scientific experts to present evidence which supports their respective views. 
(Weingartner, 1999, p. 156) 
Thus, without adopting some material assumptions that expert-discussants disagree over, 
(discourse-)analysts face difficulties in justifiably claiming that a policy option is de facto 
favorable over another. In such cases, it may not be unreasonable for public context audiences 
to align themselves to the expert’s ethos in order to decide for or against one or the other 
policy, rather than come to no evaluation.  
 Therefore, in the absence of (what are normally called) decisive reasons, it can be 
legitimate to personally endorse the opinion of experts found to be (more) trustworthy, and 
attack those not deemed worthy of one’s trust.9 Perceptions of trust may thus be legitimate 
reasons for favoring one policy over another. Hence, provided with a choice among equally 
(un)supported policy options—in the sense of a tie between the respective argument-
contents—otherwise identical verbal behavior becomes explainable independently of cognitive 
deficits or asymmetries. 
 Conversely, one way of adjusting the explanation on the deficit model consists in the 
demand that the policy in question (for or against which an expert has raised an argument 
claim complex) is not part of a controversy featuring equally unsupported policy options. Other 
than for cases already “shelved” (according to our best historical accounts), it may prove 
difficult to ascertain as much.10 
                                                
8  However, unique solutions may become available later. Presently, for instance, inoculation is widely (though 
not universally) accepted as the best policy. When introduced in 18th century England to fight smallpox, at 
first, the procedure proved controversial throughout modern Europe. 
9  Relatedly, one may also explain ad hominem attacks when this condition is flouted. Thus, assume that EXP 
supports policy P with reasons R1,… , Rn, while citizen C rejects P for reasons unrelated to R1,… , Rn—say, 
because P will literally change C’s backyard, which C perceives to threaten her entrenched ways of life. Then 
E will not appear trustworthy, because C is already “sold” on P being a false policy. See the next subsection. 
10 In specific cases (e.g., risk estimates or the distribution of funds to competing projects), analysts may find it 
reasonable to side with the results of elicitation techniques which make us of performance weighed solutions 
to aggregating (or “pooling”) expert opinion such as the Cooke Method, which “generally produces 
uncertainty spreads that are narrower than the ‘democratic’ pooling approaches [e.g., the equal weight view], 
but wider than those provided by single experts” (Aspinal, 2010, p. 294). 
FRANK ZENKER 
448 
5.2 Controversies Pivoting on Moral Values 
It is characteristic of some long-standing disagreements that participants diverge over a (set of) 
moral value(s). Jackson’s (2006) study of the “science of race” may be read as a case in point. 
Values may provide the perhaps most decisive reason for or against some policy. Thus, moral 
values and the biases (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009) or ideologies (see Rehg, 2010, pp. 57–80) 
sustaining them may explain behavior otherwise accounted for on a deficit model.  
 Provided that the moral values endorsed differ between expert and audience, 
audiences may consider some value-differences to support a legitimate personal attack—
namely on the grounds of the expert not endorsing a particular value subset. To give extreme 
examples, think of those who do not endorse the free speech principle in political debates or do 
endorse an unconditional free-rider strategy in economic games. Perhaps less extreme, think of 
those who reject human embryonic stem cell research on religious grounds, or not (see Zenker 
2010).  
 Such value divergences between experts and their non-expert audiences leave hardly 
any explanatory role for cognitive asymmetries, unless some values are considered morally 
true, yet cognitively comparatively more costly to recognize as true than others. In fact, in the 
case of a controversy at the scientist-citizen interface, such value differences may preclude 
(some, perhaps all) cognitive grounds from having relevance. As an example, consider that 
freedom of research constitutes a value that, presumably, is strongly endorsed by many 
scientists, and is presumably not strongly endorsed by many citizens. 
 Conversely, one way of adjusting the explanation on the deficit model consists in the 
additional demand that the policy in question is not part of a controversy pivoting on moral 
values. It may prove difficult to find too much in the remainder set. Would the discussion on 
the potential harm of electromagnetic radiation (mobile phones, microwaves, etc.) qualify as a 
controversy or a scientific debate? 
5.3 Ad hominem as a Strategic Move 
To postulate a cognitive deficit on the part of the non-expert audience is strictly insufficient to 
yield the desired explanandum: the occurrence, at a high frequency, of ad hominem attacks. A 
complete explanation based on this postulate would include at least two additional factors: the 
desire or preference (ascribable to the non-expert) to somehow evaluate the expert, her 
argument, or both. Moreover, a complete explanation would also include a desire or preference 
to engage in argumentative verbal behavior. After all, why not rest silent, content with 
judgment suspended?  
 Generally, an ad hominem attack implies a cognitive deficit only if participant 
behavior maps strictly into one side of the presumed cognitive asymmetry, namely into a “lack 
of understanding.” However, strategic attempts at deception (“misleading signals”) provide a 
counterexample. Put differently, when exploiting a cognitive asymmetry to explain public-
context data, one supposes that public-context audiences do not play strategies.  
 It is not clear if this constitutes a sound assumption, especially as the media impress 
upon the public context various forms of “spin doctoring.” As outlined above, a personal attack 
may be the “better” strategy even if a non-expert fully understands the expert’s reasoning-
claim complex, and could perhaps also engage with that complex on the basis of its content-
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(de)merits. At any rate, participant behavior to-be-explained is not without further assumptions 
indicative of a cognitive deficit or asymmetry.  
 Conversely, one way of adjusting the explanation on the deficit model consists in the 
demand that these conditions are met. Yet, it is not clear when we can safely say they are. 
5.4 What Did You Say? 
Without special training, few communicate in readily understandable terms, even to experts in 
other fields.11 At times, the overt message-content may be so rudimentary that a correct uptake 
requires having understood it previously. Very short talks at very large conferences make for a 
“good” example. Politeness standards, a long standing tradition of disregarding (“playing 
over”) communicative infelicities, and—perhaps more widespread among academics than 
other professions—fear of appearing ignorant by asking for clarification sustain this condition. 
 Apart from the above, experts regularly draw from a specialized lexicon normally not 
shared outside of their domain. They also tend to endorse ways of construing support relations 
between reasons the domain-relative validity of which precludes them from being shared 
widely. Think of inference to the best explanation, or a logical calculus rule such as negation 
as failure. Empirical studies suggest that, without special training, lay arguers may normally 
not be assumed to correctly understand classical argumentation figures such as reductio ad 
absurdum (van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels , 2009, p. 80) which are frequent in academic 
settings. 
 Finally, when speakers intentionally favor “code” (aka esoteric expressions) over 
more “pedestrian” ways of putting matters, then the relevant asymmetry may not so much 
implicate a cognitive, but a social level—that at which status is perpetuated.  
[C]ognitive boundaries between technical and lay knowledge are, at least to a significant degree, 
rhetorically constructed, and are crucial to the maintenance of social and political boundaries. Thus, 
interrogating the cognitive distinction challenges the social distinction, and the power produced by 
that distinction, as well. (Kinsella, 2002, p. 199) 
 One need not restrict this view to expert-citizen interaction, but may apply it also to 
discourse across scientific fields. Even the unavoidable division of labor typical of large scale 
research projects—which is said to incur a constant reliance on others’ expertise—might be 
interpreted as evidence in favor of unsuccessful communication between scientists.12  
                                                
11  Hardwig (1991) points out that (implicit) trust rules most ways of coming to know even between scientists. 
After all, experiments are mostly not repeated in identical setup; the review process does normally assume that 
data are not faked; in large scale research, scientists can at best reliably evaluate the competences of a few of 
their collaborators. 
12  For the medical domain, Fallowfield and Jenkins (1999) trace such communication deficits to both 
institutional and educational shortcomings (e.g., too little time; disciplinary training vis-à-vis interdisciplinary 
work-life), and report these to negatively affect communication between medical researchers, practitioners, 
and patients, measured, for example, by information recall. Perhaps one reason in support of this general view 
is the almost complete absence, on most of our campuses, of “old fashioned” ideas such as a studium generale 
which could, in principle, enable scientists—before they acquire and further develop specialized knowledge—
to learn to communicate “with one voice,” rather than be socialized into the disparate jargons of various fields. 
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6. SUMMARY 
We have tried to undermine the claim that citing cognitive deficits between experts and 
audiences provides a good explanation for the observation that the public context regularly 
witnesses attempts at lowering an expert’s trustworthiness, rather than engaging with the 
content of an expert’s argument. While such audiences may be able to engage cognitively, we 
have suggested that they may chose not to do so provided that cognitive reasons do not 
significantly favor one policy option over others, or when arguing ad hominem is the more 
persuasive strategy, or when policy controversies pivot on differences in moral values. 
Moreover, we have suggested that cases which allegedly indicate cognitive differences may 
also be viewed as cases of communicative incompetence on the part of experts or instances of 
perpetuating social differences. In particular, the claim that arguing ad hominem may be the 
more persuasive strategy compared to engaging cognitively as a non-expert is open to potential 
falsification.  
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